Get Signaling Goodness: Social Rules and Public Choice PDF

By Phillip J. Nelson;Kenneth V. Greene

ISBN-10: 047211347X

ISBN-13: 9780472113477

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Extra info for Signaling Goodness: Social Rules and Public Choice (Economics, Cognition, and Society)

Sample text

No new issue is raised by church attendance as a substitute signal. Of course, the more imperfect knowledge of others’ church attendance, the less church attendance will serve as a substitute signal for charity. Even though there is some uncertainty about the sign of the relationship between number of associates and charity, we are still able to get one unambiguous prediction. There are several variables positively related to the number of close associates. They should have similar directional effects on charity.

The game is started by somebody asking another person chosen at random for a favor. People know the relevant characteristics of the distribution of others, but they do not know individual characteristics. Though reciprocity is a relationship between two players, we assume that each player has many potential partners, so that no player will continue dealing with another player if he expects to do better by choosing another potential partner at random. This assumption accords with reality, and it vastly simpli‹es the analysis.

Finally, he can be a favor initiator, one who both reciprocates favors done by others and is willing to do favors to those who have not previously done him a favor. In terms of our model, these choices do not depend upon variation in moral superiority person to person. ) Which category a person chooses depends both on individual characteristics and these same characteristics for the group upon whom he is depending for favors. These characteristics are the gain from receiving a favor (g), the cost of giving a favor (c), and the rate of time preference (r).

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Signaling Goodness: Social Rules and Public Choice (Economics, Cognition, and Society) by Phillip J. Nelson;Kenneth V. Greene

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